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Abstract
We improve the non-asymptotic key rate shown by Scarani and Ren-
ner by proposing several methods to construct tighter conservative confi-
dence intervals of the phase error rate than one shown by them. In addition,
we show that the accurate channel estimation method non-asymptotically
increases the key rate over the amplitude damping channel as well as the
asymptotic case in the BB84 protocol.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted great attention as a feasible appli-
cation of quantum information science with the current device technology [10].
The goal of a QKD protocol is to share a random bit sequence not known by the
eavesdropper Eve, between the legitimate sender Alice and the receiver Bob. The
fundamental feature of QKD protocols is that the maximum amount of informa-
tion gained by Eve can be determined from the channel estimate between Alice
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and Bob. Such a task cannot be conducted in classical key distribution schemes.
If the estimated amount is lower than a threshold, then Alice and Bob determine
the length of a secret key from the estimated amount of Eve’s information, and
can share the secret key by performing the information reconciliation (error cor-
rection) and the privacy amplification. Since the key rate, which is the length
of securely sharable key per channel use, is one of the most important criteria
for the efficiency of QKD protocols, the estimation of the channel is of primary
importance.
Conventionally in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [2], we only
use the statistics of matched measurement outcomes which are transmitted and
received by the same basis, to estimate the quantum channel; mismatched mea-
surement outcomes, which are transmitted and received by different basis, are
discarded in the conventionally used channel estimation methods. By contrast,
Watanabe et al. [30] showed that by using the statistics of mismatched measure-
ment outcomes in addition to that of matched measurement outcomes, we can
estimate a quantum channel more accurately, thereby a higher key rate can be
achieved than the conventional one. However their analysis was only asymptotic,
i.e., they assumed that the number of sample bits for channel estimation is infinite.
Hence, for practical use, it is necessary to perform non-asymptotic analysis.
For non-asymptotic analysis of the QKD protocol, Scarani et al. formulated
a lower bound on secure key rate [24, 25]. Other researches of non-asymptotic
analysis was surveyed by Cai et al. [5]. Since the formula by Scarani et al. has
enough generality, in theory it enables us to calculate not only non-asymptotic key
rate based on the conventional channel estimation but also the one based on the
accurate channel estimation [30] for the BB84 protocol.
On the other hand, in Cai et al. [5, p.4], it was suggested that a lower bound
on secure key rate shown by Scarani et al. might be able to be improved. In the
channel estimation step shown by Scarani et al. the channel parameter is guessed
by interval estimation. However, the method of constructing confidence region
of the interval estimation is not unique. Even when we use the confidence region
which is different from the one shown by Scarani et al. if it satisfies the condition
of conservativeness, the security of the final key is guaranteed. Specifically, even
if one-sided interval estimation is used, the security is still kept.
In this paper, we show two things: First, we show several methods of recon-
structing the confidence region, and the fact that they increase the non-asymptotic
secure key rate in the BB84 protocol. Second, we show the utility of accurate
channel method on the BB84 protocol using finite sample bits. To do this, we
compare the non-asymptotic key rate based on the accurate channel estimate to the
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conventional one by numerical computation over the amplitude damping channel
and the depolarizing channel.
We stress that the assumption used in this paper is exactly the same as [24]. In
particular, we assume no prior knowledge of channel nor channel model with the
accurate channel esitimation, as well as its asymptotic case [30]. In the numerical
comparison in Section 3.3, we shall use the depolarizing channel and the ampli-
tude damping channel to generate the mesurement outcomes, but the proposed
protocols do not assume the knowledge of the underlying channels, and estimate
the channel among all the possible channels.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We first review previously
known results in Section 2. Second, we show several methods to improve the
key rate and the results of the improvements in Section 3. Last, we state the con-
clusion in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 BB84 protocol
Typical one of the QKD protocols is the BB84 protocol invented by Bennett and
Brassard [2]. The goal of the BB84 protocol is to share a random bit sequence
not known by the eavesdropper Eve, between the legitimate sender Alice and the
receiver Bob. In the following, we briefly describe the flow of the protocol and the
accurate channel estimation shown by Watanabe et al. [30] on the BB84 protocol.
2.1.1 Overview of BB84 protocol
BB84 protocol consists of the following four steps:
i. Distribution of quantum information: Alice sends N quantum objects, for
example photon polarizations, to Bob over a quantum channel.
ii. Parameter (or channel) estimation: Alice and Bob disclose a part of the
transmission/received information to each other to estimate the quantum
channel between Alice and Bob.
iii. Information reconciliation: For the bit string not disclosed in step ii, Alice
sends the syndrome to Bob, and Bob corrects an error by using the syndrom.
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iv. Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob compress corrected bit strings in step
iii according to the same hash function so that compressed bit string is sta-
tistically independent of information obtained by Eve. Consequently, com-
pressed bit string is the final key.
The security of the final key obtained by BB84 protocol can be proven only by the
axiom of quantum mechanics [24, 25].
2.1.2 Accurate channel estimation
In this section, we explain the distribution of quantum informationin and convena-
tional parameter estimation more concretely. Moreover, we explain the accurate
channel estimation shown by Watanabe et al. [3] on the BB84 protocol.
Alice first randomly sends bit 0 or 1 to Bob by modulating it into a trans-
mission basis that is randomly chosen from the z-basis {|0z〉, |1z〉}, the x-basis
{|0x〉, |1x〉}, where |0a〉, |1a〉 are eigenstates of the Pauli matrix σa for a ∈ {z,x},
respectively. Then Bob randomly chooses one of measurement observables σz,
σx, and converts a measurement result +1 or −1 into a bit 0 or 1 respectively.
After N transmissions, Alice and Bob publicly announce their transmission bases
and measurement observables. They also announce m(< N) bits of their bit se-
quence for estimating channel EB from Alice to Bob. Conventionally, Alice and
Bob discard mismatched measurement outcomes, which are transmitted and re-
ceived by different bases [27]. In contrast, Watanabe et al. [30] show that by
using the statistics of mismatched measurement outcomes in addition to that of
matched measurement outcomes, we can estimate a quantum channel more ac-
curately, thereby the key rate is at least higher than the conventional one. In
particular, the key rate is generally improved over the conventional one over any
channel, and only if the quantum channel is the Pauli channel, those two key rates
are equal [29].
2.2 Method of type
In this section, we review the method of type [9, Chapter 11] that are used in this
paper. Let X be a finite set. For a sequence xm = (x1, . . . ,xm) ∈X m, the type of
xm is the empirical probability distribution Pxm defined by
Pxm(a) :=
|{i | xi = a}|
m
for a ∈X .
Then, the following theorems hold.
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Theorem 1. [9, Theorem 11.2.1] Let PX be a probability distribution on X and
Pxm be the type of the sequence xm drawn according to the m-fold product distri-
bution PmX . Then, for any δ ,
Pr
[
D(Pxm||P)> δ
]≤ 2−m(δ−|X | log2(m+1)m )
where D(·) is the relative entropy. Note that the base of a logarithm and a (con-
ventional) entropy are 2 throughout this paper.
Lemma 1. [9, Theorem 11.6.1] Let P and Q be probability distributions. Then
||P−Q||1 ≤
√
2(ln2)D(P||Q)
where || · ||1 is the variational distance defined by ||P1−P2||1 := ∑x∈X |P1(x)−
P2(x)|, where P1,P2 are probability mass functions on X .
Corollary 1. Let Pxm be the type of X . For any δ > 0,
Pr
[||Pxm −P||1 > δ]≤ 2−m( δ 22ln2−|X | log2(m+1)m ).
2.3 Non-asymptotic key rate analysis
In this section, we rephrase non-asymptotic key rate analysis shown by Scarani et
al. [25] on the BB84 protocol in terms of interval estimation. This paraphrase is
necessary to clarify the relation between the method shown by Scarani et al. and
our proposed one. Note that interval estimation of a quantum channel for QKD
protocols is also discussed in [14, 15].
2.3.1 Interval estimation
Here we briefly review some basic concepts of the interval estimation. See text-
books of statistics for more details (e.g. [6]).
The goal of the interval estimation is to estimate the unknown statistical pa-
rameter θ by observed samples. First, we define the confidence region. Let a
sample sequence X = X1, · · · ,Xn ∼ Pθ be i.i.d., and Θ be the parameter space. For
any α between 0 and 1, if a set C(X)⊂Θ satisfies
∀θ ∈Θ,Pθ [θ ∈C(X)]& 1−α, (1)
then C(X) is called a confidence region. Specially, if θ is real-valued, then C(X)
is usually an interval of real numbers, sometimes called the confidence interval.
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In addition, the real-number 1−α is called the confidence level or confidence
coefficient. If the inequality in Eq. (1) is always satisfied, i.e.
∀θ ∈Θ,Pθ [θ ∈C(X)]≥ 1−α,
then such C(X) is called a conservative confidence region.
Second, we describe the one-sided interval estimation. Suppose that θ is a
real number. One-sided interval estimation is defined as constructing the upper
bound on θ satisfying
∀θ ∈ Θ,Pθ [θ ≤C(X)]& 1−α. (2)
The interval (−∞,C(X)] is called a one-sided confidence interval with confidence
level 1−α . Of course, if the inequality in Eq. (2) is always satisfied, the interval
(−∞,C(X)] is conservative.
2.3.2 Channel estimation using finite sample bits
One of the practical issues of QKD protocol is that sample bits used for channel
estimation is limited to a finite number. Scarani et al. showed a method for interval
estimation of the quantum channel [24, 25]. Hereafter, the basis {|0〉, |1〉} is the
z-basis unless otherwise stated.
The channel EB, which denotes a qubit channel from Alice to Bob, can be also
described by the Choi operator [8] ρAB := (id ⊗ EB)(|ψ〉〈ψ|) for the Bell state
|ψ〉= 1√2(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉). For any εPE(0 ≤ εPE ≤ 1), let [5]
ξ :=
√
2ln(1/εPE)+2d ln(m+1)
m
,
Γξ :=
{
ρAB : ||λm−λ∞(ρAB)||1 ≤ ξ}, (3)
where λm are obtained by measurements of m samples of ρAB according to a
POVM measurement with d outcomes, and λ∞(ρAB) denotes the perfect statis-
tics in the limit of infinitely many measurements. Then Γξ can be interpreted
as the conservative confidence region with confidence level 1− εPE for the qubit
channel ρAB. Indeed, for any ρAB, we can see
Pr[||λm−λ∞(ρAB)||1 ≤ ξ ] ≥ 1−2−m( ξ
2
2ln2−d
log2 (m+1)
m ) (4)
= 1− εPE
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by Corollary 1 in Section 2.2. Note that the definition of variational distance used
in this paper is the same as [9] and twice as large as the one used in [5] and that
the right hand side of Eq. (4) is twice as large as [5, Eq. (3)], where [5, Eq. (3)] is
corrected in its erratum. By the same argument as [5], we see that for d = 2 we
can use
pobserved +
√
ln(1/εPE)+2ln(m+1)
2m
(5)
as the worst-case estimate of the so-called phase error rate, where pobserved is
the actually observed phase error rate. We shall use Eq. (5) in the numerical
comparison in Section 3.3.
2.3.3 Lower bound on the secure key rate of the BB84 protocol
First, we define ε-security [1, 23]. For any ε ≥ 0, a final key K is said to be
ε-secure with respect to an adversary Eve if the joint state ρKE satisfies
||ρKE − τK ⊗ρE || ≤ ε,
where τK is the completely mixed state on a key space SK , and || · || is the trace
distance. The parameter ε can be interpreted as the maximum failure probability
in which an adversary might have gained some information on K.
Next, we describe the lower bound on the ε-secure key rate of the BB84 pro-
tocol using finite samples shown by Scarani et al. [25]. If the length l of the final
key is
l = N
[
min
ρAB∈Γξ
SρAB(X |E)−δ (¯ε)
]−leakεEC −2log2 1εPA , (6)
then the final key is ε-secure, where SρAB(X |E) is the conditional von Neumann
entropy for the state ρAB, and Γξ is the confidence region for ρAB with the con-
fidence level 1− εPE , and ε ≥ εPE . See [24, 25] for more detail of Eq. (6). This
formula enables us to calculate the non-asymptotic key rate based on the accurate
channel estimate and the conventional one for the BB84 protocol respectively.
Remark 1. Eve’s ambiguity for Alice’s bit SρAB(X |E) can be calculated from
the Choi operator ρAB as follows. Let the density operator ρXB be derived by
measurement on Alice’s system, i.e., ρXB := ∑x∈F2(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)ρAB(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I).
The conditional von Neumann entropy SρAB(X |E) is defined by SρAB(X |E) :=
S(ρXE)− S(ρE), where S(·) is the von Neumann entropy and ρE is the partial
trace of ψABE , which is the purification of ρAB, over the joint system of Alice and
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Bob. Noting that SρAB(X |E) = SρAB(X |B) and S(ρE) = S(ρAB), SρAB(X |E) can be
calculated by SρAB(X |E) = S(ρXB)−S(ρAB).
3 Improvement of key rate
In this section, we present several methods of improving the lower bound on the
secure key rate by replacing the confidence region as shown in Eq. (3). In general,
the smaller the confidence region Γξ is, the bigger Eve’s worst-case ambiguity
minΓξ SρAB(X |E) can grow. Even when we use the confidence region which is
different from Γξ , if it is conservative, the security of the final key is guaranteed.
Hence, the lower bound in Eq. (6) can be improved by reconstructing the confi-
dence region with confidence level 1− εPE tighter than Γξ because the influence
from the different channel estimation method appears only in Eve’s worst-case
ambiguity in Eq. (6). In addition, we clarify the utility of the accurate channel
estimation method in the BB84 protocol using finite sample bits by numerically
computing Eve’s worst-case ambiguities over the amplitude damping channel and
the depolarizing channel.
We first present several methods for composing such confidence region in Sec-
tion 3.1. Then we show how to compute Eve’s worst-case ambiguity with the
accurate channel estimation in Section 3.2. Last we compare Eve’s worst-case
ambiguities by the proposed methods and the accurate channel estimation in Sec-
tion 3.3. Hereafter, we distinguish the conventional channel estimation reviewed
Section 2.1.2 and the conventional confidence region shown by Scarani et al. [5]
to avoid confusion. We call the former the conventional channel estimation, and
the latter the conventional confidence region or merely Γξ .
3.1 Reconstruction of confidence region
3.1.1 Relative entropy
Here, we reconstruct the confidence interval with confidence level 1− εPE using
the relative entropy. Let
ξ ′ := log2 (1/εPE)+d log2 (m+1)
m
,
Γξ ′ :=
{
ρAB : D(λm||λ∞(ρAB))≤ ξ ′}, (7)
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where D(·) is the relative entropy [9]. Then in the following, we prove that the set
Γξ ′ is the conservative confidence region for ρAB with confidence level 1− εPE ,
and Γξ ′ ⊂ Γξ .
Proof. From Theorem 1, obviously
Pr
[
D(λm||λ∞(ρAB))≤ ξ ′] ≥ 1−2−m(ξ ′−d log2(m+1)m )
= 1− εPE
Thus, Γξ ′ is the conservative confidence region for ρAB with confidence level 1−
εPE . In addition, let
η = D(λm||λ∞(ρAB))− ||λm−λ∞(ρAB)||
2
1
2ln2 ,
then
||λm−λ∞(ρAB)||1 ≤ ξ
⇔ D(λm||λ∞(ρAB))≤ ξ ′+η
Thus, Γξ can be rewritten as follows;
Γξ =
{
ρAB : D(λm||λ∞(ρAB))≤ ξ ′+η}.
From Lemma 1, η ≥ 0. Therefore, Γξ ′ ⊆ Γξ .
Hence, by replacing Γξ of Eq. (6) with Γξ ′ , we can surely gain a higher key
rate than the conventional one.
3.1.2 Binomial one-sided confidence bounds
Here we describe a general method for converting an upper bound on the tail
probability of the binomial distribution B(m, p) into the conservative one-sided
confidence interval for p with confidence level 1−εPE , where m is the number of
Bernoulli trials and p is the probability of success on each trial. In the conven-
tional channel estimation, Eve’s worst-case ambiguity can be calculated by the
estimated phase error rate [22]. We can use the one-sided interval estimation [6]
to guess the phase error rate. The one-sided interval estimation for phase error
rate is equivalent to that for p of binomial distribution B(m, p), which can be per-
formed by converting an upper bound on the tail probability of B(m, p). Thus we
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describe such a method. In addition, we enumerate concretely some upper bounds
for B(m, p), and show that one-sided confidence intervals gained by those bounds
can increase Eve’s worst-case ambiguity compared with Eqs. (3) and (7).
Hereafter, X be a random variable according to PX = B(m, p), and ¯X = X/m.
i. Preliminary : First of all, we describe the general converting method. Our
goal is to construct the one-sided confidence interval, i.e. calculating the
upper bound C(X) similar to Eq. (2). Assume that δ is an arbitrary real
number between 0 and p, and u(m, p,δ ) is a real-valued function. Then
an upper bound on the tail probability of the binomial distribution can be
generically described as
PX
[
¯X ≤ p−δ]≤ u(m, p,δ ).
Thus, by a straightforward calculation, we can show
PX
[
p ≤ ¯X +δ]≥ 1−u(m, p,δ ). (8)
In Eq. (8), by setting δ as u(m, p,δ ) = εPE for all p and given m, we can
regard Eq. (8) as the conservative one-sided confidence interval with con-
fidence level 1− εPE , thereby C(X) = ¯X +δ in Eq. (2). Moreover, we can
calculate C(X) from the function u, the sample size m, and the realization
of ¯X as follows. From the fact that u(m, p,δ ) = εPE for any p, we have
u(m,C(X),C(X)− ¯X) = εPE . (9)
By regarding the left-hand side of Eq. (9) as a function of C(X), i.e. um, ¯X(C(X)) :=
u(m,C(X),C(X)− ¯X), we get
um, ¯X(C(X)) = εPE (10)
⇔ C(X) = u−1
m, ¯X(εPE). (11)
Therefore, we can calculate C(X). Note that the inverse function of um, ¯X
exists since it is generally monotonically decreasing function on [ ¯X ,1]. Fur-
thermore, the tighter the function um, ¯X is, the smaller the value of C(X).
Therefore, we can construct a smaller confidence interval by using the tighter
bound um, ¯X .
ii. Chernoff bound [7] : For any 0 ≤ δ ≤ p, Chernoff bound is described by
PX
[
¯X ≤ p−δ]≤ 2−mD(p−δ ||p). (12)
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By considering u(m, p,δ ) = 2−mD(p−δ ||p), we can gain
um, ¯X(C(X)) = 2−mD(
¯X ||C(X)). (13)
Thus we can calculate C(X) in the same manner as Eq. (11).
On the other hand, from Eqs. (10) and (13), we have
2−mD( ¯X ||C(X)) = εPE
⇔ D( ¯X ||C(X)) = log2 (1/εPE)/m. (14)
Moreover, the right-hand side of Eq. (14) is smallar than ξ ′, that is,
log2 (1/εPE)/m < ξ ′.
Hence we can see that the confidence interval [0,C(X)] by Chernoff bound
is tighter than Γξ ′ by comparing Eq. (14) with Eq. (7).
iii. Factorial moment bound [21] : For any 0 < δ ≤ p, the factorial moment
bound is described by
PX
[
¯X ≤ p−δ]≤ µ{µ − (1− p)}· · ·{µ−n∗(1− p)}
t(t−1) · · ·(t−n∗) , (15)
where t =m(1− p+δ ) and µ =m(1− p), and n∗= ⌊(t−µ)/p⌋. Therefore,
by considering
u(m, p,δ ) = µ{µ − (1− p)}· · ·{µ −n
∗(1− p)}
t(t−1) · · ·(t−n∗) ,
we can compute C(X) as well as Chernoff bound.
Since the upper bound in Eq. (15) is tighter than the one in Eq. (12) [19],
the value of u−1
m, ¯X(εPE) , which is calculated from the fractional moment
bound is smaller than the one from Chernoff bound, thereby the confidence
interval by the fractional moment bound is also tighter.
iv. Klar bound [12] : Let
fx :=
(
m
x
)
(1− p)xpm−x (0≤ x ≤ m).
Then for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ p, Klar bound is described by
PX( ¯X ≤ p−δ )≤ (n+1)p
n+1− (m+1)(1− p) fn,
11
where n = m(1− p+δ ). Thus, we can calculate C(X) by setting
u(m, p,δ ) = (n+1)p
n+1− (m+1)(1− p) fn. (16)
In Eq. (16), if m is very large, it is difficult to compute the binomial coef-
ficient
(
m
n
)
. To calculate this value, we can use the following lemma.
Lemma 2. [17, Lemma.7, p.309] Suppose m and n(≤ m) are integers. Then
(
m
n
)
≤ 1√
2pimλ (1−λ )2
mh(λ ),
where λ = n/m, and h(·) is the binary entropy.
3.2 Computing with the accurate channel estimation
The computation method of Eve’s worst-case ambiguity minρAB∈Γξ SρAB(X |E) in
Eq. (6) with accurate channel estimation using finite sample bits has not been
clarified. Therefore, we show how to compute it in this section.
First of all, observe that the formula (6) found by Scarani and Renner [24, 25]
is so general that we can also just apply Eq. (6) to the the accurate channel estima-
tion. There is no need to develop a new analysis for the accurate channel estima-
tion with finite samples. So we need to numerically compute minρAB∈Γξ SρAB(X |E)
in Eq. (6). However, we use Γξ ′ of Eq. (7) instead of Γξ . There are two reasons
for this choice. Firstly, Γξ ′ is smaller than Γξ as shown in Section 3.1.1, and we
have minρAB∈Γξ ′ SρAB(X |E) ≥ minρAB∈Γξ SρAB(X |E). Secondly, we can differenti-
ate the mathematical expressions in Γξ ′ and the differentiability often helps the
numerical optimization.
An analytical computation of Eve’s worst-case ambiguity may be impossible.
Therefore, to obtain this value, it is necessary to solve the following minimization
problem:
minimize : SρAB(X |E) (17)
subject to : ρAB is a real Choi matrix
: ρAB ∈ Γξ ′ .
Note that when ρAB is the real matrix, the optimum value of Eq. (17) among all
the complex Choi matrices is achieved by Proposition 1 of [30]. This allows us to
12
restrict the range of minimization to real matrices. Without Proposition 1 of [30]
the range of minimization must be complex matrices.
Fortunately, this problem is a convex optimization because the objective func-
tion SρAB(X |E) is a convex with respect to ρAB [30] and Γξ ′ is a convex set. Note
that the convexity of Γξ ′ can be easily proved by facts that a sublevel set of a con-
vex function is convex [4] and the relative entropy is convex [9]. Hence, we can
compute the global optimum value of Eq. (17).
Remark 2. A standard algorithm to solve a constrained minimization problem
like Eq. (17) is the interior-point method (e.g. see [4]), and the gradient and
the Hessian of the objective function are usually required to use this algorithm.
In Eq. (17), however, it is difficult to calculate those of the objective function
SρAB(X |E) because SρAB(X |E) is the function that depends on eigenvalues of 4×
4 matrices. To calculate those derivatives, we can use the method for spectral
functions. The gradient can be handily derived by using Theorem 1.1 of [16], and
the Hessian by Proposition 6.6 of [26].
Remark 3. The interior-point method requires a strictly feasible starting point,
which means that the point strictly satisfies all the constraints. In particular, we
should find the Choi operator ρAB satisfied D(λm||λ∞(ρAB))< ξ ′ for given λm and
ξ ′. Since such a point is not known, we should solve another convex optimization
problem,
minimize : D(λm||λ∞(ρAB))
subject to : ρAB is a real Choi matrix
as a preliminary stage, called phase I [4]. Note that the starting point of this
optimization can be an arbitary Choi matrix. The strictly feasible point found
during phase I is then used as the starting point for the original problem, which is
called the phase II.
Remark 4. By switching the role of Alice and Bob in the information recon-
ciliation step, we can sometimes asymptotically gain a higher key rate than the
original procedure that is called the direct reconciliation [30]. Such a procedure is
usually called the reverse reconciliation [3, 18]. A non-asymptotical key rate for
the reverse reconciliation can be derived by replacing SρAB(X |E) of Eq. (6) with
SρAB(Y |E) [30]. For calculating the gradient and the Hessian of SρAB(Y |E), we can
use the result in [11].
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Remark 5. The optimization problem (17) can also be regarded as a semidefinite
optimization with a nonlinear convex objective function. Recently, several meth-
ods have been proposed for solving such kind of the optimization problem, for
example, [13, 28, 32, 31]. In the numerical computation in Section 3.3, we used
the method proposed in [13, 28].
3.3 Comparison of Eve’s worst-case ambiguities
The influence from the different channel estimation method appears only in Eve’s
worst-case ambiguity in Eq. (6). Therefore, we can compare the secure key rates
only by Eve’s worst-case ambiguities.
In Section 3.1, we showed in theory that the confidence interval is smaller in
the following order: Γξ , Γξ ′ , the one-sided confidence interval by using Chernoff
bound, the one-sided confidence interval by the factorial moment bound. There-
fore, Eve’s worst-case ambiguities grow also in this order in the conventional
channel estimation. However, the relation between those confidence intervals and
the one-sided confidence interval by using Klar bound is not clear. Thus, we com-
pare Eve’s worst-case ambiguities in the BB84 protocol by the proposed methods
over the following channels:
i. amplitude damping channel

 θZθX
θY

 7→

 1−q 0 00 √1−q 0
0 0
√
1−q



 θZθX
θY

+

 q0
0

 , (18)
ii. depolarizing channel

 θZθX
θY

 7→

 1−q 0 00 1−q 0
0 0 1−q



 θZθX
θY

 , (19)
where (θZ,θX ,θY ) describes the representation of a qubit vector in the Bloch
sphere, and the channel parameter q is a real number between 0 and 1 [20]. Fur-
thermore, we show computation results of Eve’s worst-case ambiguity with the ac-
curate channel estimation over those channels on Figs. 1 and 2. These values with
the accurate channel estimation are computed by using MATLAB 2009bSP1 and
PENNON 1.0, which can be purchased from PENOPT GbR (www.penopt.com).
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We included the MATLAB routines of our numerical computation into the sup-
plementary data to this article so that the scientific community can verify out
results. Note that the horizontal axis in two figures indicates the sample size used
to estimate each channels with the accurate channel method, and the vertical axis
indicates Eve’s worst-case ambiguity.
Remark 6. In the conventional channel estimation, Eve’s worst-case ambiguity
is calculated as follows. Let p˜ be the worst-case estimate of phase error rate with
confidence level 1−εPE , namely C(X) in Eq. (2), then Eve’s worst-case ambiguity
is well-known value 1−h(p˜) [22], where h(·) is a binary entropy.
Remark 7. The sample size for the accurate channel estimation is about four
times as many as that for the conventional channel estimation in our comparison.
This is because we estimate the channel by using measurement outcomes only
when both Alice and Bob choose x-basis in the conventional channel estimation.
While, in contrast, in the accurate channel estimation we estimate the channel by
using all measurement outcomes when Alice and Bob choose the transmission
basis and the measurement observable among x-basis and z-basis with probability
1/2 respectively.
Remark 8. In Figs. 1 and 2, Eve’s worst-case ambiguities with the conventional
channel estimation are computed by assuming that empirical distribution λm is
equal to theoretical distribution determined uniquely by ρAB of each channel, be-
cause the channel corresponding to any λm always exists. By contrast, in the
accurate channel estimation, the channel corresponding to measured statistic λm
does not necessarily exist [33]. Thus we compute Eve’s worst-case ambiguities
by λm generated with the pseudo-random number generator, to keep fairness of
the comparisons.
3.4 Discussion
From Figs. 1 and 2, we can see two facts: First, our proposed confidence in-
tervals improve non-asymptotically Eve’s worst-case ambiguity over the conven-
tional confidence region. The amount of the improvement by “conventional Klar”
compared with “conventional variational” is about 1.1% at 107 samples in both
figures. Klar bound is the larger than Chernoff bound and the factorial moment
bound, though the differences are small. In addition, since convergences of these
bounds are faster than that by Γξ , we can gain a higher key rate for fewer samples
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Figure 1: (Color Online) Comparison of Eve’s worst-case ambiguities in the
BB84 protocol over the amplitude damping channel against the sample size with
the accurate channel estimation. “accurate relative” is Eve’s worst-case ambigu-
ity with the accurate channel estimation obtained solving the convex optimiza-
tion Eq. (17) (see Section 3.2). Moreover, “conventional variational” and “con-
ventional relative” are Eve’s worst-case ambiguities with the conventional chan-
nel estimation by Γξ and Γξ ′ , “conventional Chernoff,” “conventional moment,”
“conventional Klar” are ones by the one-sided confidence interval using respec-
tive bounds (see Section 3.1.2). Note that “conventional Chernoff” and “conven-
tional Moment” almost overlap. Parameters are the channel parameter q = 0.1
(see Eq. (18)), εPE = 10−5.
in which key rate with Γξ is small. For example from Fig. 2, when the sample
size is 104, we can see that the value by Γξ is about 0.56, in contrast, the value by
Klar bound is about 0.67. Secondly, Eve’s worst-case ambiguity with the accurate
channel estimation is non-asymptotically much higher compared with all values
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Figure 2: (Color Online) Comparison over the depolarizing channel. “accurate
relative” is Eve’s worst-case ambiguity with the accurate channel estimation ob-
tained solving the convex optimization Eq. (17) (see Section 3.2). Moreover,
“conventional variational” and “conventional relative” are Eve’s worst-case am-
biguities with the conventional channel estimation by Γξ and Γξ ′ , “conventional
Chernoff”,“conventional moment”,“conventional Klar” are ones by the one-sided
confidence interval using respective bounds (see Section 3.1.2). Note that “con-
ventional Chernoff” and “conventional moment” almost overlap. Parameters are
channel parameter q = 0.1 (see Eq. (19)), εPE = 10−5.
with the conventional channel estimation over the amplitude damping channel, for
example from Fig. 1, when the sample size is 107, about 20% higher than Γξ .
However, from Fig. 2, the accurate estimate is the smallest over the depolarizing
channel.
Observe that the accurate channel estimation (with relative entropy) gives the
worse estimate than the conventional channel estimation with relative entropy, for
all samples sizes over the depolarizing channels, though their asymptotic limits
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of minSρAB(X |E) are the same as shown in [30]. In the authors’ opinion, this is
because the accurate channel estimation has to estimate the larger number of pa-
rameters and the accuracy of estimate is degraded by the increase in the number
of parameters. Note that the number of parameters is 7 for the accurate chan-
nel estimation and 1 for the conventional one. On the other hand, the accurate
channel estimation gives better estimates with larger sample sizes over the ampli-
tude damping channel. This is because the asymptotic limit of the accurate chan-
nel estimation is much larger than the conventional one, as shown in [30], while
the accurate channel estimation also experiences the degradation by the increased
number of parameters with smaller sample sizes as well. Since the asymptotic
limit of the accurate channel estimation is always larger than the conventional one
if the channel is not Pauli one [29], the accurate channel estimation is expected to
work better when the channel is supposed to be non-Pauli and the sample size for
channel estimation is large.
4 Conclusion
The accurate channel method non-asymptotically increases the key rate over the
amplitude damping channel. Thus, we should not discard mismatched measure-
ment outcomes in that case. However, the key rate non-asymptotically depreciates
over the depolarizing channel. On the other hand, in the conventional channel es-
timation, the non-asymptotic key rate shown by Scarani et al. is improved by
reconstructing the confidence interval for a channel using the one-sided interval
estimation with tail probability bounds. One-sided intervals can improve the key
rate in the following order of tail probability bounds: the variational distance, the
relative entropy, Chernoff bound, factorial moment bound, Klar bound.
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